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On May 27 the Ninth Circuit decided Xilinx v. Commissioner.1 By a 2-1 majority, the panel reversed the Tax
Court and held that costs of employee stock options must
be included in the pool of costs subject to a tax-sharing
agreement.
The Xilinx decision is important for three reasons.
First, cost sharing is probably the key element in current
transfer pricing law because it is the principal way in
which profits from intangibles get shifted from the
United States to low-tax jurisdictions. Moreover, informed observers agree that the allocation of income
from intangibles is the most important problem in transfer pricing, and because most intangible-intensive corporations rely heavily on employee stock options, the
narrow issue decided in Xilinx has large revenue implications, especially for high-tech companies. This is evidenced by the filing of two amicus briefs on behalf of
coalitions of high-tech companies siding with the taxpayer and by practitioners’ reactions to the IRS victory.2
Second, Xilinx is the first IRS victory in a major
transfer pricing case since Dupont was decided in 1979.
While the issue in Xilinx was narrow, it is possible that
this IRS victory could lead more multinationals to reconsider their decision to fight the IRS on transfer pricing
issues rather than seek an advance pricing agreement.
The author has long believed that given the litigation
record of 30 years of successive taxpayer victories in
transfer pricing cases, an important IRS victory is needed

1
Xilinx, Inc. et al. v. Commissioner, Nos. 06-74246, 06-74269
(9th Cir. May 27, 2009), Doc 2009-11943, 2009 TNT 100-9.
2
Sam Young, ‘‘Ninth Circuit Reversal of Tax Court in Xilinx
a Major Government Victory, Practitioners Say,’’ Tax Notes, June
1, 2009, p. 1070, Doc 2009-11945, 2009 TNT 100-1. Of course, the
revenue impact is enhanced by the large concentration of
high-tech companies in the Ninth Circuit. An appeal of Xilinx to
an en banc Ninth Circuit or to the Supreme Court seems likely. If
Xilinx is upheld, one would expect taxpayers in other circuits to
try to create a circuit split, and the decision may even cause
high-tech companies to migrate out of the Ninth Circuit.
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to encourage taxpayers to enter into APAs, and the
combination of the $3.4 billion Glaxo settlement and
Xilinx may be enough. Because only about half of the
approximately 350 multinational companies enter into
APAs, a significant increase in APAs would go a long
way toward resolving the transfer pricing problem.
Third, the specific reasoning of the case casts renewed
doubts on the continued viability of the arm’s-length
standard (ALS). In my view, this reasoning is correct,
albeit too narrow. If the implications of Xilinx are understood, this may finally be the occasion to prod the Obama
administration and Congress to engage in a major transfer pricing overhaul, which is a precondition to significant international tax reform.
The rest of this article will develop this third point.
Part A explains how the reasoning in Xilinx fits in with
broader critiques of the ALS. Part B explores the implications of this critique for the prospects of international
tax reform. Part C concludes by explaining why this
moment is an opportune one for such reform.

A. Xilinx and the ALS
The Tax Court decided Xilinx on the grounds that
unrelated parties dealing with each other at arm’s length
would not have shared the cost of employee stock
options, and therefore the ALS requires that those costs
not be shared under a cost-sharing agreement, either.3
The appeals court explicitly accepted this factual finding
and even went further in explaining why unrelated
parties would never share the costs of such options.
Nevertheless, the majority decided (over a vigorous
dissent by Judge Noonan) to require that stock option
costs be included in the sharing pool.4
To understand the significance of this decision, it is
necessary to step back and examine how the cost-sharing
regime arose in the first place. Before 1986 there was a
succession of cases in which U.S. pharmaceuticals successfully defended their transfer of patents on drugs
developed in the United States to affiliates in Puerto Rico.
The result was a lopsided allocation of costs to the United
States and of profits offshore, where they were taxed at a
very low rate. As the Court of Federal Claims stated in
one of those cases:
For tax years 1972 through 1976, MSDQ [Merck’s
Puerto Rican affiliate] reported taxable income that
totals $181,802,000. Federal income tax paid was
$657,000. The pricing process that produces such
disparity between costs of production and endproduct prices, and permits the accumulation of
retained earnings that amount to 98.82 percent of

3
Xilinx Inc. et al. v. Commissioner, 125 T.C. 37 (2005), Doc
2005-18073, 2005 TNT 168-4.
4
Xilinx, supra note 1.
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In the early 1980s, Congress began to take steps to
remedy this problem. The 1982 Tax Equity and Fiscal
Responsibility Act amended section 936 to provide that
income from intangibles transferred to Puerto Rico affiliates would be treated as income of the Puerto Rican
corporation’s U.S. shareholders, unless the corporation
elected to make cost-sharing payments to its parent or to
equally split the profits.6 The next step was taken in the
Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which amended section
367(d) to treat a tax-free transfer of intangibles to related
foreign corporations as a sale of the intangibles for
annual payments over the useful life of the property,
contingent on its productivity, use, or disposition.7 Finally, in the 1986 Tax Reform Act, Congress for the first
time amended section 482 by adding the second sentence,
which states that ‘‘in the case of any transfer (or license)
of intangible property (within the meaning of section
936(h)(3)(B)), the income with respect to such transfer or
license shall be commensurate with the income attributable to the intangible.’’8 This ‘‘super-royalty’’ rule was
intended to force taxpayers that transfer intangible property out of the United States to make royalty payments
that rise as the profits from the intangibles increase, thus
nullifying the economic effect of the transfer.
At the time, there was significant criticism of the
super-royalty rule as a departure from the ALS because it
could rarely be shown that unrelated taxpayers would
have agreed to such a royalty arrangement. However, the
legislative history of TRA 1986 indicates Congress understood that the basic problem was the ALS and that the
super-royalty rule was to apply even if it was inconsistent with the ALS. The House report stated:
Many observers have questioned the effectiveness
of the ‘‘arm’s length’’ approach of the regulations
under section 482. A recurrent problem is the
absence of comparable arm’s length transactions
between unrelated parties, and the inconsistent
results of attempting to impose an arm’s length
concept in the absence of comparables. . . .

5

Merck & Co. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 73 (1982). For a survey
of the other cases, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘The Rise and Fall
of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International
Taxation,’’ 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89 (1995), updated version in 9 Finance
and Tax L. Rev. 310 (2006).
6
Joint Committee on Taxation, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., ‘‘General
Explanation of the Revenue Provisions of the Tax Equity and
Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,’’ 82-96 (Comm. Print 1983).
7
Section 367(d)(2).
8
Section 482. A similar commensurate with income standard
was applied to section 367(d) transfers of intangibles and to
section 936(h) cost-sharing payments.
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A fundamental problem is the fact that the relationship between related parties is different from that of
unrelated parties. Observers have noted that
multinational companies operate as an economic
unit, and not ‘‘as if’’ they were unrelated to their
foreign subsidiaries. In addition, a parent corporation that transfers potentially valuable property to
its subsidiary is not faced with the same risks as if
it were dealing with an unrelated party. Its equity
interest assures it of the ability ultimately to obtain
the benefit of future anticipated or unanticipated
profits, without regard to the price it sets. The
relationship similarly would enable the parent to
adjust its arrangement each year, if it wished to do
so, to take account of major variations in the
revenue produced by a transferred item. . . .
Certain judicial interpretations of section 482 suggest that pricing arrangements between unrelated
parties for items of the same apparent general
category as those involved in the related party
transfer may in some circumstances be considered a
‘‘safe harbor’’ for related party pricing arrangements, even though there are significant differences
in the volume and risks involved, or in other
factors. . . . While the committee is concerned that
such decisions may unduly emphasize the concept
of comparables even in situations involving highly
standardized commodities or services, it believes
that such an approach is sufficiently troublesome
where transfers of intangibles are concerned that a
statutory modification to the intercompany pricing
rules regarding transfers of intangibles is necessary.9
Given this critique, the House did not pretend that the
commensurate with income standard was compatible
with the ALS. The report states the transferor of intangibles in a multinational was looking to its equity investment, ‘‘rather than to ‘arm’s length’ factors,’’ to
recuperate its cost,10 and that ‘‘industry norms or other
unrelated party transactions do not provide a safe harbor
minimum payment for related party intangible transfers.’’11 Thus, even if a perfect comparable could be found
in which the same intangible was transferred to an
unrelated party in the same circumstances for a fixed
royalty rate, the provision would still require the allocation of super-royalties to a related-party transferor. The
conference agreement on TRA 1986 followed the House
bill except for the expansion of the commensurate with
income provisions to apply to inbound as well as outbound transfers.12

9
H.R. Rep. No. 426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 423-424 (1985)
(footnote omitted).
10
Id. at 424.
11
Id. at 425 (emphasis added).
12
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. II-637 (1986),
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4075, 4725.
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all reported taxable income, may be economically
unjustified or socially unacceptable. Such results
may underscore infirmities in the controls to be
expected in regulated pharmaceutical markets.
Such results do not establish a distortion of income
as to MSDQ. Such problems cannot be addressed
through Section 482, under the statute and regulations as presently written.5
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13
Michael Durst, IFA Canada speech (May 21, 2009). For a
discussion, see Avi-Yonah, supra note 5. For the text of the
speech, see p. 1269.
14
T.D. 8632 (1995), Doc 95-11248, 95 TNT 247-4; reg. section
1.482-7. As the Xilinx majority emphasized, the cost-sharing
regulations were finalized six months after the other transfer
pricing regulations.
15
Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.
16
Bausch & Lomb v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 525 (1989), aff’d, 933
F.2d 1084 (1991). In Bausch & Lomb the taxpayer transferred
valuable knowledge to its Irish subsidiary. The knowledge
enabled the subsidiary to manufacture contact lenses at a much
lower cost than that of its competitors. This added value would
be lost if the subsidiary were unrelated to the parent; therefore,
the courts correctly rejected the IRS’s attempt to allocate the
added value to where the knowledge was developed.
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real research and development outside the United States.
Those intangibles then generate income that is eligible for
deferral, especially with the use of the check-the-box regs
and section 954(c)(6) to shift profits from high-tax to
low-tax jurisdictions without triggering subpart F inclusions. The result has been that taxpayers are able to locate
as much profit in low-tax jurisdictions as they could
before 1986.17
With this background, we are now ready to understand Xilinx. The issue in the case was whether to include
the cost of employee stock options in the pool of costs to
be shared under a cost-sharing agreement with Xilinx’s
Irish subsidiary. In general, the more costs there are that
must be shared, the less valuable the cost-sharing agreement is to the taxpayer, because costs allocated to the
Irish subsidiary cannot be deducted in the United States.
Many high-tech companies are able to eliminate their
U.S. tax liability by deducting the cost of stock options
while locating their foreign profits in low-tax jurisdictions such as Ireland.
The Tax Court and the dissent argued that because the
costs of the options would not be shared by unrelated
parties, under the ALS they cannot be included in the
pool of costs shared under the cost-sharing agreement.
They pointed out that reg. section 1.482-1(b)(1) requires
that ‘‘the standard to be applied in every case is that of a
taxpayer dealing at arm’s length with an uncontrolled
taxpayer,’’ and that article 9 of the Ireland-U.S. tax treaty
requires applying the ALS to transfer pricing cases. In his
dissent, Judge Noonan argued that the ALS is essential to
the purpose of the transfer pricing regulations, which is
‘‘parity between taxpayers in uncontrolled transactions
and taxpayers in controlled transactions. The regulations
are not to be construed to stultify that purpose. If the ALS
is trumped by the cost-sharing regulations, the purpose
of the statute is frustrated.’’18
However, the majority held that the ALS was not the
focus of section 482: ‘‘Significantly, achieving an arm’s
length result is not itself the regulatory regime’s goal;
rather, its purpose is to prevent tax evasion by ensuring
taxpayers accurately reflect taxable income attributable
to controlled transactions.’’19 It then held that the language of reg. section 1.482-1(b)(1), incorporating the ALS,
is irreconcilable with the language of reg. section 1.4827(d)(1), which required the sharing of ‘‘all of the costs’’
related to developing the shared intangible. According to
the court, the conflict arises because unrelated taxpayers
do not share the costs of stock options because (1) they
are hard to value because no cash outlay is involved, (2)

17

See Martin A. Sullivan, ‘‘Obama Launches International Tax
Reform: The Battle Begins,’’ Tax Notes, May 11, 2009, p. 646, Doc
2009-10299, or 2009 TNT 87-3 (23 percent of the before-tax
profits of U.S. multinational entities were in five low-tax jurisdictions in 2006); Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst, ‘‘Allocating
Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a
Formulary Profit Split,’’ Fla. Tax Rev. (2009), Figure 2 (30 percent
of the profits of U.S. multinational entities in 2005 were in
Bermuda, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, and 8 out of the
top 10 locations had an effective tax rate of below 10 percent).
18
Xilinx, supra note 1, at 6180.
19
Xilinx, supra note 1, at 6167.
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The following period (1986-1994) was what Michael
Durst has called ‘‘the Great Transfer Pricing Wars.’’13
After the United States published the white paper in 1988
and proposed regulations under section 482 in 1992, there
was a concerted lobbying effort by our trading partners
and by the multinationals to weaken what they saw as
departures from the ALS and as steps in the direction of
formulary apportionment. The result was a compromise
embodied in the final regulations under section 482 and
the new OECD transfer pricing guidelines (1995). More
importantly for our purposes, the new regulations included the cost-sharing method.14
Cost sharing rests on the idea that there should be
some relationship between the allocation of profits from
an intangible and the allocation of the costs to develop it,
which also underlies the profit-split method in the regulations and stems ultimately from the 1988 white paper.15
Under cost sharing, the U.S. parent and its foreign
affiliate agree to share the costs of developing an intangible, and if they meet the requirements of a valid
cost-sharing agreement, the regulations permit them to
allocate the profits from the intangible in the same
proportion as the costs.
There are three fundamental problems with cost sharing. First, the basic idea that the profits from an intangible are related to the costs of developing it is wrong. As
shown by Bausch and Lomb and many others, in many
situations the profits from an intangible result from the
relationship between the related parties and therefore are
unrelated to where the costs of development were incurred.16
Second, if an intangible is successful, its profits bear
little relation to its costs. The idea behind cost sharing is
that taxpayers would be reluctant to lose the deductions
allocated to the foreign affiliate, and therefore would not
allocate too high a cost and profit to the foreign affiliate.
But taxpayers whose costs are $1 million to develop a
patent worth $1 billion are happy to risk losing $800,000
to an 80/20 cost-sharing agreement with an Irish affiliate
if they could avoid current U.S. tax on $800 million when
the research succeeds.
Third, cost sharing has proven in practice to undermine the rationale behind the super-royalty rule. Taxpayers have used cost sharing to transfer the majority of
their intangible assets overseas without having to do any
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20

Xilinx, supra note 1, at 6176.
Avi-Yonah, supra note 5.
22
Xilinx, supra note 1, at 6171.
23
National Westminster Bank v. United States, 512 F.3d 1347
(Fed. Cir. 2008), Doc 2008-905, 2008 TNT 11-10 (holding that the
ALS in article 7 of the U.K.-U.S. treaty trumps the interest
21

B. Xilinx and International Tax Reform
The particular point decided in Xilinx is narrow but
important. The basic problems of cost sharing will continue unabated: Taxpayers will still be able to use cost
sharing to move profits from intangibles out of the
United States, even if the costs are somewhat more
broadly defined to include stock options (as they explicitly are under the new, post-Xilinx cost-sharing regulations). Cost sharing underlies the skewed profit
distributions noted above. Thus, a broader reform is
needed, and Xilinx points the way.
Fundamentally, I have long believed that corporate
taxation should be source-based rather than residencebased. I believe this for two reasons. First, corporate
residence is not very meaningful because, unlike individuals, corporations are not physically present in any
country, cannot vote, and are an inappropriate subject for
redistributive taxation. Second, source-based taxation of
corporations rests on the benefits corporations receive
from engaging in business activity in countries that
incurred costs to enable that business activity to take
place.
This argument supports the view of those who would
move the United States closer to a territorial system.
Territoriality has many advantages because it eliminates
the incentive not to repatriate earnings and offers simplification potential by reducing the need for a foreign tax
credit. If done properly, it is also a revenue raiser because
deductions allocated to exempt foreign-source income
would be disallowed.
But I have also repeatedly argued against territoriality
in the current context and have supported efforts (like the
current one by the Obama administration) to restrict or
even repeal deferral. The reason is simple: Without
transfer pricing reform, territoriality will lead to an even
stronger incentive to shift profits overseas and to further
revenue losses and the erosion of the U.S. corporate tax
base.24
I believe the key to any international tax reform must
be a transfer pricing overhaul. As my coauthors Kim
Clausing and Michael Durst and I have argued, one
possibility is to adopt a formula (which we suggested
should be sales based) to split profits left over after
routine contributions by the related affiliates are accounted for.25
Such a reform can be enacted by Congress, and we
have included proposed legislative language in our article. Xilinx supports our position because it points out
that the ALS cannot be applied in a key area of transfer
pricing law.

allocations regulations). In my opinion this case was wrongly
decided because of the long tradition of applying formulas to
reach arm’s-length results, which is the only requirement under
article 7 (see OECD model article 7(4)).
24
See Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Comment on Yin, Reforming the Taxation
of Foreign Direct Investment by US Taxpayers,’’ 28 Va. Tax Rev.
281 (2008).
25
Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst, supra note 17.

(Footnote continued in next column.)
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sharing them in an unrelated joint venture would create
an incentive to minimize the value of the joint venture to
reduce the cost of the options, and (3) sharing the costs
reduces the deductions available to the taxpayer.20 For
these reasons, there will be no comparables in which the
costs are shared, but the court nevertheless held that the
all-costs requirement governs because it is the more
specific regulation. Finally, the court rejected the challenge based on the Ireland-U.S. tax treaty because of the
savings clause, which is found in every U.S. tax treaty
and states that the treaty cannot affect the ability of the
United States to tax its own residents, such as Xilinx.
I believe that given the history of section 482 and the
cost-sharing regulations, the majority is correct, albeit not
quite for the reason it gives (as the dissent correctly notes,
it is hard to put too much weight on canons of construction such as the one the majority relies on that the specific
trumps the general). First, section 482 predates the ALS
by at least a decade, so it cannot be said that achieving
the ALS is ‘‘the purpose’’ of section 482.21 Rather, as the
majority correctly argued, the purpose of section 482 is to
accurately reflect the taxpayer’s income and prevent tax
evasion, and the ALS is only a means to that end (which
was not really given meaning until 1968, over four
decades after the language of section 482 was enacted).
Second, there is a good reason why cost sharing
cannot be reconciled with the ALS: Cost sharing grew out
of the super-royalty rule, which was explicitly not based
on the ALS. Thus, the majority is correct in viewing cost
sharing as a distinct regime that is not subject to the ALS.
If unrelated parties do not share costs that related parties
do, that means that cost sharing between related parties
cannot be governed by the ALS, and that the ALS is
irrelevant to this area of transfer pricing law. That was
Congress’s goal when it enacted the super-royalty rule in
1986, and the same insight should be applied to cost
sharing.
Third, the majority is also correct in rejecting the
challenge posed by the Ireland-U.S. treaty. However, its
reasoning has interesting implications that it does not
seem to appreciate. The majority states that ‘‘Xilinx is not
a foreign entity, so applying [reg. section] 1.482-7(d)(1) to
it does not violate the treaty, even if the regulation’s all
costs requirement is at odds with the treaty’s arm’s
length standard.’’22 But this point applies to all transfer
pricing cases, not just to those involving a U.S. parent,
because Xilinx also involved a foreign entity (the Irish
subsidiary). If the savings clause is read to enable the IRS
to apply non-ALS methods to Xilinx, it can also apply
them to U.S. subsidiaries of foreign parents because those
are also U.S. resident corporations. In that event the only
cases in which the ALS applies under a treaty would be
to U.S. branches of foreign entities, as the courts held
(incorrectly) in NatWest.23

COMMENTARY / VIEWPOINTS

26
Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst, supra note 17; on the
treaties point, see also Avi-Yonah and Clausing, ‘‘Reforming
Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt
Formulary Apportionment,’’ in Jason Furman and Jason Bordoff, eds. Path to Prosperity: Hamilton Project Ideas on Income
Security, Education, and Taxes (Brookings Institution Press) 319344 (2008). If the Xilinx court is right, however, FA does not
violate article 9 of the treaties because of the savings clause.
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reject it, (2) it penalizes multinationals for conducting
R&D in the United States, and (3) it encourages multinationals to enter into cost-sharing agreements that artificially shift profits to low-tax jurisdictions. Also, as the
Bausch & Lomb court stated, if the value of the intangible
results from the fact that two parties are related, that
added value is distinct from where it was developed.
If the U.S. approach is rejected, the question is how to
allocate the residual. The OECD guidelines are silent on
this issue. This presents an opportunity. Perhaps in this
context, it is possible to adopt a formula to allocate the
residual.
One must realize that if there are no comparables (by
definition) and the residual results from the relationship
between the parties and would disappear if they were
unrelated, the ALS is meaningless and any allocation is
arbitrary. Under these circumstances the key is to adopt
the formula that is most likely to achieve consensus.
In the unilateral U.S. context, my coauthors and I
support a sales-based formula similar to the destinationbased formula for a VAT. This formula favors exports and
therefore is likely to be politically popular, and it favors
the United States because of our trade deficit.27 In the
OECD context, I would prefer a more balanced formula
with three components: payroll, tangible assets, and
sales.
Those three components are of course part of the
traditional U.S. state FA formula. This formula has
proven to be remarkably successful, because, in addition
to being used by many U.S. states, it is also the basis for
the global dealing regulations in the United States and
OECD, and is a leading candidate for the common
consolidated corporate tax base formula. I believe it
makes sense because each of its elements is objective
(payroll and sales are transactions with outside parties,
and while tangible assets depend on valuations, there is
a lot of experience with asset-based formulas, such as the
U.S. interest allocation formula). Intangibles are excluded, but in my opinion that is appropriate because
their value results from physical and human capital and
from the market, and those elements are included, and
you cannot allocate their value, and trying to include
them invites manipulation.
Thus, I would propose that in difficult transfer pricing
cases, in which no comparables can be found beyond the
return on routine functions, the United States should
adopt and the OECD should endorse using the traditional three-factor state formula to allocate the residual
under the profit-split method.
I believe this proposal addresses the problems with FA
outlined above.
• While the formula is arbitrary, it relates to economic
reality, and any allocation is arbitrary without comparables. The OECD guidelines are also arbitrary in
not allocating residuals.
• It is unlikely that this outcome would lead to more
double taxation than what already occurs for residuals under the ALS. If the United States allocates
residuals based on the location of R&D and other

27

Avi-Yonah and Clausing, supra note 26.
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However, our proposals have not persuaded opponents of FA. Instead, the advocates of the ALS point to a
list of asserted deficiencies of FA, including:
• FA is inherently arbitrary;
• FA will produce double taxation because some
countries will apply the ALS and others FA, and
each FA country will have a different formula;
• FA requires an impossible-to-achieve uniformity of
the tax base;
• FA violates tax treaties; and
• FA will be impossible to enact because of the opposition of the multinationals and of countries that will
lose from its implementation.
I believe that there is a good answer to each of those
arguments, and have in fact replied to them at length
elsewhere.26 However, I also realize that my answers are
unlikely to persuade FA opponents. Thus, I want to use
this article to propose a more modest step forward:
adopting FA only in the context of the ALS (rather than
replacing the ALS with FA).
The basic problem arises in situations when there are
no good comparables. If good comparables exist, the
traditional methods (comparable uncontrolled price,
cost-plus, and resale price) can be used, and that would
end the story. But as the OECD guidelines acknowledge,
in many cases good comparables are hard to find.
The next possible alternative under the OECD guidelines is the transactional net margin method (TNMM).
However, TNMM requires a tougher comparability test
than does the U.S. CPM, which is good because CPM has
proven to be the most manipulable of the current
methods. An informed economist working for a major
accounting firm has told me he can achieve any result the
client wants using CPM. CPM is also a huge source of
transactional complexity — a boon to the large accounting firms and a problem for those who cannot afford their
services. But the tougher OECD TNMM comparability
standard means that TNMM cannot be applied in many
cases in which CPM is used in the United States.
This leaves profit split. Under the profit-split method,
comparables are used to allocate the return on routine
functions. But that usually leaves a residual in place,
which arises precisely because multinationals exist to
earn a return that cannot be achieved in an arm’s-length
relationship. That is why good comparables are hard to
find.
The main issue in transfer pricing is how to allocate
the residual under the profit-split method. The U.S.
regulations assume that the residual is the result of
high-profit intangibles and allocate it to where such
intangibles were developed. However, this method is not
helpful, because (1) the OECD and the rest of the world
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countries disagree, double taxation is already a
threat. Disputes can be resolved using the new
arbitration provision under the OECD model.
• If the OECD accepts the residual formula under
ALS, it does not violate treaties and it can be
handled in the context of article 9.
• Because it is only a residual formula, the base has
already been defined under ALS.
• A balanced formula is less likely to produce consistent losers.

C. Conclusion: The Time for Reform Is Now
Xilinx presents an opportunity for reforming U.S.
international taxation. Narrowly, it may lead more
multinational entities to enter into APAs, which are the
key to reducing transfer pricing disputes in the current
system.
More broadly, Xilinx indicates yet again that the ALS is
irreparable. The reasons are set out at length elsewhere,
and I will not repeat them.28 I believe now is the time to
reform transfer pricing, for three reasons:
• The current debate over deferral and territoriality is
unlikely to be resolved unless the administration
and Congress undertake transfer pricing reform.
• The EU, traditionally the bulwark of the ALS, is
moving toward adopting FA as part of its Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base project.29
• Even the OECD, also a bulwark of the ALS, is
showing some flexibility toward adopting formulas
in the context of profit split, and is about to designate profit split as a method on par with the
traditional ALS-based methods.30
Thus, I believe this a propitious time for reform and
that the administration and Congress should use the
current debate over deferral and territoriality to engage
in transfer pricing reform along the lines outlined above.

28

Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst, supra note 17.
On CCCTB, see, e.g., Jack Mintz and Joann Weiner, ‘‘Some
Open Negotiation Issues Involving a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base in the European Union,’’ 62 Tax L. Rev. 81
(2008).
30
See Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Between Formulary Apportionment and
the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation,’’ available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1411649.
29
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